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The law-and-economics literature recogni�es rlurt the deterrent effect of stiffer
ton penalties exists only so long as the wrcfeasor would be solvent if a judg

ment were rendered against it. The literature further stales rlurt increasing the
penalry past the point of insolvency would have no additional deterrent effect.
In this Article, Professor Michael Knoll describes an important class of situa-

Prof�ssor of Law, University of Southern California; John M. Olin Senior Research
Scholar at Columb1a University School of Law ( 1996-1997); Visiting Scholar at NYU School of
Law ( 1 996-1997 ) . I thanlc Omri &:n-Shahar, Mitch Polinslcy, and audi�nces at Columbia and
Stanford Law Schools for rh�ir comments, and Joann Peters for her res�arch assistance.
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tions in which, once the point of insolvenc:1 is renched, the deterrent effect of
stiffer tort penalties does not merely disappear but has the counterintuitive
effect of encouraging the penali�ed activity. When the liability pertains co a
possibly defective produce !hat has already been sold, stiffer penalties can
encourage a manufacturer co continue to produce the product. Because stiffer
penalties reduce the manufacturer's equity if the product is dangerous and pro
duction ceases, but has no additional effect on its equity if the product is dan
gerous and production continues, the manufacturer risks less by continuing
production when penalties are stiffer. This can lead the manufacturer co con
tinue production, whereas with less stiff penalties it would cease production.

INTRODUCTION
Both proponents and opponents of products liability reform agree that
larger judgments will discourage companies from introducing and con
tinuing to market many products and services. They part over the
desirability of these effects.

Defenders of the status quo argue that stiff

penalties have forced manufacturers to remove unsafe products from the
market and, better still, have prevented other dangerous products from ever
being sold.

In contrast, reformers argue that stiff penalties have

discouraged producers from introducing many safe, new products into the
market. Both positions are premised on the belief that larger judgments
will discourage the penalized activity. This Article describes an important

exception to that rule. Specifically, this Article describes a large class of

cases in which the usual intuition is reversed-stiffer penalties encourage
companies to produce and sell risky products that they would otherwise
withdraw from the market were penalties lower.
That counterintuitive result is driven by the possibility of discharge in
bankruptcy.

Both personal bankruptcy and corporate limited liability

establish upper bounds on what an individual or corporation can lose if it is
assessed a large tort judgment.1

Because debts are discharged in bank

ruptcy, neither an individual nor a corporate tortfeasor can lose more than
its current net wealth. As a result, the literature has long recognized that
penalties in excess of a party's net wealth have no additional deterrent
effect.2 What has not previously been recognized is that such larger penal
ties might actually encourage the production of riskier products.
Bankruptcy is governed by federal law; state law provides for limited corporate liabil1.
ity. Set DouGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 82-87 (1992).
Set A. Mitch dl Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A No� on Opomal Fmts When Wealth
2.
Varies Among Jndillidual.s, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618, 618 (1991); Steven Shavell, The Judgment
Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 45, 45 (1986).
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The intuition behind that result is as follows: When faced with a
decision whether to continue producing a product that might be dangerous,

a rational decisionmaker will compare its expected wealth if it continues

production with its expected wealth if it ceases production.' Once penal
ties are stiff enough that the decisionmaker will be bankrupt if it continues
production and is held liable, further increasing liability awards will have
no effect on its expected wealth if production continues. However, if the
manufacturer would not be bankrupt if it ceased production and is held
liable, then further increasing liability awards will reduce its expected

wealth if production ceases. In this range, the cost to the decisionmaker of
continuing production decreases as liability awards increase.

As a result,

the decisionmaker might continue to produce a potentially dangerous
product that it would have stopped producing if liability awards were

smaller. This is the "perverse effect."

Part I of this Article provides a simple numerical example of the

perverse effect, in which stiffer penalties encourage the production of
risi<ier products in a strict liability regime. Part II generalizes that result
and shows that when there are prior sales, there is always a range over
which increasing the stiffness of tort penalties has the perverse effect. Part
Ill discusses the factors that influence the magnitude of the effect and
argues that the effect is very likely widespread because it can occur even at
low penalty levels.

Part IV extends the basic result to a more complex

world that uses a negligence standard. Part V discusses avenues for further

research, including several potential solutions to the perverse effect of high
liability awards.

I.

A SIMPLE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF THE PERVERSE EFFECT

The perverse effect of stiffer tort penalties in products liability cases
can be made more concrete through a simple numerical example. Consider

the decision whether to continue to produce widgets in a strict liability
regime.

Assume that the manufacturer concludes that there is a 1 0%

chance that widgets are dangerous, in which case previously sold widgets
will cause $4 million in harm. Also, assume that if the manufacturer con3.
T? simplify the d Kussion, I assume that the actors are ruk neutral. Although thu
. IS not necessary to denve the principal results, it subscanually Simplifies the mathe
assumption
matics. I also assume that the decision whether to continue production is made on the basu of
the manufacturer's expected net equity. That is to say, the manufacturer will continue pro,
duction when its expected equity u higher if it continues; otherwise, it will cease production.
i
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tinues production, it will earn a $1 million profit.4 Furthermore, if the
manufacturer continues to produce and sell widgets, and if the widgets are
dangerous, an additional $16 million in harm will occur. Assuming that
the manufacturer is liable for the full amount of the harm caused by its
widgets and has enough equity so it will not be bankrupt if its widgets are
dangerous-at least $19 million when it makes the decision-the equity·
holders will cease production.s
Alternatively, assume that the manufacturer's equity is only $12
million when it makes the decision. I f the manufacturer ceases production,
and if its widgets are not dangerous, the manufacturer's equity will be $12
million; but if the widgets are dangerous, the manufacturer's equity will be
$8 million after paying its liability. Because there is a 90% chance that its
widgets are not dangerous, the manufacturer's equity has an expected value
4. I ignore considerations relating to the time value of money because such considcra·
tions would complicate the exposition.
5.
That the manufacturer will cease production if it has at least$19 million of equity can
be seen as follows: If the manufacturer ceases production, and if its widgets are not dangerous, the
equity will be the original $19 million. But, if the widgets are dangerous, the equity will be $15
million. Because there u a 90% chance that the widgets arc not dangerous, the manufacturer's
equity has an expected value of$18.6 million-that is, (0.9 x$19 million)+ (0.1x$15 million).
If, however, the manufacturer continues production, then its equity w1ll be $20 million if its
widgets are not dangerous and $0 if they are dangerous. Thus, if it continues production, the
manufacturer's equity has an expected value of $18 million ((0.9 x $20 million) + (0. 1 x $0)),
which is$600,000 less than its expected value if production ceases. Thus, the manufacturer will
cease producing widgets. The result is illustrated in the following table:

Not Dangerous
Dan2erous
Expected Value

Cease Production
$mill1ons probabilitY
19
0. 9
15
0. 1
18.6

Continue Production
$millions probability
20
0.9
0
0.1
18

Although the manufacturer might now wish that it had never started production, the deci·
s1on to begin production might have been rational when made, as illustrated by the following
example. Assume that when the manufacturer first began to produce widgets, it thought there
would be a 50% probability that the current situation-a 10% chance that the product is dan·
gerous-would exist, and a 50% probability that the manufacturer would definitely know that
the product was safe. Assuming further that, as expected, the manufacturer broke even on sales
until this point. Thus, if the product had proven to be safe, the manufacturer would have earned
a $1 million profit. Because there was a 50% chance of this occurring, this possibility had an
expected value of $50 0,000. This value exceeds the manufacturer's $400,000 expected cost of
producing widgets if It had not already been proven safe,which had an expected cost of$200,000
when production first began. Thus, by beginning widget production, the manufacturer increased
the expected value of its equity by$300,000.

Products Liability and Legal Leverage

103

on, and
of $ 1 1.6 million.6 If, however, the manufacturer continues producti
but if
equity;
of
million
if its widgets are not dangerous, it will have $13
contin·
turer
manufac
the
if
Thus,
t.
they are dangerous, it will be bankrup
which is
ues production, its equity has an expected value of $ 1 1.7 million/
turer
manufac
the
because
Thus,
$100,000 more than if production ceases.
its
keep
will
it
on,
producti
ng
continui
by
gain
has a $1 00,000 expected
widgets on the market.8
a
If the penalty were smaller, however, the manufacturer might make
pay
to
has
turer
manufac
the
that
example,
for
Assume,
different decision.
turer
only 70% of any harm caused by its widgets. In that case, the manufac
is
product
the
will have $9.2 million of equity if it ceases production and
still
will
turer
dangerous.9 If its widgets are not dangerous, the manufac
widgets
have $12 million in equity. Because there is a 90% chance that its
has an
on,
producti
ceases
it
if
are not dangerous, the manufacturer's equity,
contin·
turer
manufac
the
,
expected value of $1 1.72 million.10 If, however
chance
ues production, it has a 1 0% chance of losing this equity and a 90%
$1 1.7
of
value
expected
an
has
This
of having $13 million in equity.
manu·
the
of
value
expected
the
than
million,11 which is $20,000 less
Thus, because the manu·
facturer's equity from ceasing production.
6. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production ceases is calculated as
follow.: Expected Value (Ceasing) (0.9 x $12 million) + (0. 1x$8 million) $11. 6 million.
7. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production continues u calculated
as follows: Expected Value (Continuing) (0.9 x$13 million)+ (0.1x$0) $11.7 million.
8. The result is illustrated in the following table:
•

•

•

Not Danl!erous
Danl!erOUS
Expected Value

=

Cease Production
$millions probabilitv
0 .9
12
0.1
8
11.6

Continue Production
orobab1litv
$millions
0.9
13
0. 1
0
11. 7

If its widgets arc dangerous, the manufacturer will pay $2. 8 million- 70% of the total
9.
harm of $4 million. Because the manufacturer has equity of$12 million, it will have$9.2m1lhon
after it pays the judgment.
10. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production ceases is calculated as
follows: Expected Value (Ceasing)= (0. 9 x $12million)+ (0.1x$9.2 million)=$11.72million.
11. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production continues IS calculated
as follow.: Expected Value (Continuing)
(0.9 x $13 million) + (0.1 x $0) $11.7 million.
Thu u exactly the same as in note 7, supra, because the manufacturer is bankrupt tf producuon
continues and the product is dangerous, regardless of whether the penalty is I 0 0% or 70% of any
harm.
•

•
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facturer would have a $20,000 expected loss by continuing it will d1'scon
2
tinue widget production. 1
�e example, therefore, illustrates that increasing the severity of tort
penalties does not always either increase deterrence or have no effect on
t�e level of deterren��-the two possibilities recognized in the existing
literature. Instead, ra1smg the severity of tort penalties from 70% to 100%
of any harm caused reduces deterrence: the manufacturer will continue
.
.
w1dgets when the tort penalty requires full compensation,
producm
�
whereas It waul� have stopped producing widgets had the penalty been
only 70%. Th1s counterintuitive result, whereby stiffer tort penalties
encourage manufacturers to produce potentially dangerous products that
they would have otherwise withdrawn from the market, is an example of
the perverse effect.
•

II.

STRJcr LJABJLJTY

This part ge eralizes the r sult set forth in the previous example
:
�
�
Whe there are pnor sales, there 1s always a range within which increasi
ng
�
the sttffness of tort penalties produces the perverse effect. This is done
in
seve ! s eps. First, this part sets out the general problem of a manufac
� �
turer
considenng whether to continue producing a potentially dangero
us
product. Se ond, � is framework is used to show that if there are no
prior
�
sales, � en mc e�mg the severity of tort penalties will discourage
the
�
productl n of nsber products until the point of bankruptcy is reached
�
.
.
After this
mt, t� ere is no additional deterrent effect from raising
�
_
pe.naltles.
Third, th1s same framework is used to show that when there are
nor
sales,
the perverse effect will occur over a range as tort penalties
�
mcrease.
To illustrate the perverse effect, this part presents the problem
of a
_
corpo t ion
manufacturing a product that might be dangerous.u The
�.
probability that the product is dangerous, p, evolves over time
as expe12. The r�ult is illustrated in the followmg table:

Not Dan�erous
Dan�erous
Exoected Value

Cease Production
$millions
orobabilitv

12
9.2
11.72

0. 9
0. 1

Continue Production
$millions
probability
lJ
0.9

0
11.7

0. 1

odlJ. . I say "might" because I focus o n the time before anyone really knows whether the
pr uct IS d angerous.

•

r
I
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rience increases and evidence is collected and evaluated. In the face of this
uncertainty, the manufacturer must decide whether to continue or cease
li
producing the product.
A.

The General Problem

Consider a manufacturing company that has equity with a net value of
E.15 If the manufacturer continues to produce, it will earn the profit from
further production, G. If the product turns out not to be harmful, it will
keep its original equity plus the profit from further production. If, however,
the product is harmful, it will produce harm, H:6 and a liability award will
be assessed against the manufacturer of 9H, in which e is a measure of the
stiffness of tort penalties. If the liability award is equal to the harm (9 1 ),
compensation is complete. If the liability award is less than the harm (9 <
1), compensation is incomplete; and if the liability award is more than the
harm (e > 1), compensation is more than complete. Thus, the higher e is,
=

the stiffer the liability regime becomes. Because the firm's probability of
being held liable is p, the firm's expected liability, assuming it continues
production, is p9H. Thus, the firm's expected equity from continuing
production, C, is given by:
(1)

C

=

E + G - p9H.

If the manufacturer decides to discontinue production, it will not earn
the profit from further sales. Nonetheless, with strict liability, the
manufacturer will be liable for any harm caused by prior sales. Thus, if the
product is dangerous and production ceases, there is less harm than if
production continues because the firm does not sell the additional units.
14. In order to simplify the mathematics, I assume throughout this Article that there is
only one date at which production can be stopped and that production, once discontinued, can
never be restarted.
15. The value of the equity, E, is calculated be{CYTe subtracting any liabilities due to the
inherent dangerousness of the product, but afrc subtracting any other liabilities the firm might
have. This simplification does not precisely follow the law, wh1ch, in bankruptcy, treats tort
creditors on par with unsecured creditors. See BAIRD, supra note I, at 79-87 (describing the
treatment of lawsuits and subsequent judgments arising in bankruptcy law); David W. Leebron,
Lirm�d UabilitJ, TCYrt Yicrinu, and Credirors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 156 5, 1637 (1991) (stating that
"(t]he holders of unsecured debt share pro rata with tort victims"). Adjusting the model to treat
tort creditors on par with unsecured creditors would not change the principal results. However,
11 would substantially complicate the mathematics, thereby obscuring the intuition.
16. To simplify the discussion, I make the unrealistic assumption that G is independent of
whether the product is acrually harmful. The model could be adjusted to account for a lower
value of G when the product IS harmful by mcreasmg H to reflect the reduction in G.

106

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 99 ( 199 7)

Considering this smaller harm, H0, the firm's expected net equity from
discontinuing production, D , is given by:
{2)

D = E - p9H0

•

Accordingly, the decision whether to continue production will depend
upon whether C (equation 1) is larger than D (equation 2). If C is greater
than D, the manufacturer will continue production; otherwise, it will stop.
Thus, the expected profit from continuing production, X (the difference
between equations l and 2), is given by:
{3)

X = C - D = G - p9(H - H0)

•

The profit-maximizing decision is to continue production if X is
positive, otherwise to discontinue it. Accordingly, the firm will continue
production if the gain from additional sales, G , exceeds the expected
liability, p9(H - H0); otherwise, it will stop.
Equation 3 , however, ignores the impact of limited liability on the
decision whether to continue production. The manufacturer's expected
gain from continuing to produce (equation 3 ) changes in the presence of
limited liability because its components (equations 1 and 2) change. With
limited liability, the manufacturer will pay the lesser of the judgment
against it or its total equity. Thus, if the manufacturer continues pro
duction and the product is dangerous, it will pay the lesser of its assessed
liability, 9H, and the sum of its equity when it chose to continue, E, and its
profits from continuation, G.17 Thus, the expected equity from con
tinuing is:
(4)

C = E + G - pmin(E

+

G, 9H) .

Similarly, if the manufacturer discontinues production and the
product is harmful, the manufacturer will pay the successful tort claimants
the lesser of their claim, 9H0, and its equity, E. Thus, the manufacturer's
expected equity from discontinuing production is given by:

(5)
17.

D = E - pmin(E, 9I-io) .

r
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It therefore follows that with limited liability, the expected gain to
equityholders from continuing production (the difference between equa
tions 4 and 5) can be written as follows:
(6)

X = C - D = (1
-

-

p)G - p[min(E, 9H

-

G)

min(E, Of:-\)] .

Once again, the profit-maximizing decision is to continue production
if X is positive and to cease production if X is negative.
No Perverse Effect

B.

Before examining the situation in which the perverse effect occurs,
consider the situation in which it does not occur. When there are no prior
sales {H0= 0), the traditional view of stiffer penalties is accurate: increasing
tort penalties discourages the production of less risky products until the
5
defendant's wealth would be exhausted! Once this point is reached, stiffer
penalties have no additional deterrent effect.
That result is established as follows: If there are no previous sales, the
firm's equity if it ceases production, D (equation 5), is equal to E, which is
independent of e. Thus, the expected gain from production {equation 6)
becomes:
(7)

X = (l - p)G - pmin(E, 9H

-

G).

In examining equation 7, there are two cases to consider depending
upon the value of e. These two cases are ordered by increasing values of e.
1.

Two Cases

19
Case I: The firm is never bankrupt: E > 9 H - G.
For small values of 9 (9 < (E +G)/ H), the firm will not be bankrupt
if the product is dangerous. When the firm can pay the full liability if the
product is dangerous, equation 7 becomes:
(8)

X

=

G

-

p9H

.

Thus, thto Articlto assumc:s that thto firm can inttontionally toxtemalazto at ltoast somto risk.

If 11 cannot, b<OcaUS<O consumtors arto as knowledgtoablto of thto risks as arto thto firm's tomploytotos, thto
modd would not apply.

18.

Thto idtoa is that hightor tort penaltic:s eliminatto thto riskitost products that would have

b<Oen productod tf penalties were lower.

19.

When the fair market value of the firm's debts exceeds the fair market value of i!S

assets, the firm ts bankrupt. Ste

BAIRD, suJlra notto

I, at 66 n. 73.
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The assumption that the liability will not bankrupt the firm does not

imply that the firm will produce the product. Whether the firm begins
production depends upon the sign of equation 8: if equation 8 is positive,

the firm will begin production; if it is negative, the firm will not. Because

equation 8 is a decreasing function of e, there is a single critical value ofp,

r

The critical value of p that separates accepted and rejected projects
can be derived by setting equation 10 equal to 0, and solving for the

resulting value of p.

measured byp'. Asp' decreases, more potentially dangerous products are
deterred. Setting equation 8 equal to 0 and solving for the critical value of

p, yields:

(9)

p'(6)

=

G

p'

(11)

=

G
E + G

Production will occur for values ofp belowp'; it will not occur for values
above p'.

2.

The Path
Neither Case I nor Case F fully describes what happens as tort

eH

where e in parentheses indicates that the critical probability is a function
of e.

Thus, the corresponding critical value of p, again

denotedp', is given by:

call it p' , that is the highest value of p for which production will occur.

That is to say, production will occur for all values of p below p', but for no
values above p'. Thus, the effectiveness of a liability system can be

109
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Because the denominator in equation 9 is a multiple of e, the critical

penalties increase; the full picture comes from combining the two cases.
For low values of e, the manufacturer is in Case I; for high values it is in

Case F. Thus, when there are no prior sales, the path of the critical
probability,p', as a function of e, is as illustrated in Figure 1 :

value of p is a decreasing function of 0: as e increases,p' falls. For very low

values of e,p' is greater than l. Because probabilities cannot be larger than

I

1 , for very low values of e, the firm will begin production even if it is
certain that the product is dangerous. However, as e increases,p' will fall
below I, and it will continue to fall as 0 increases. For values of 0, such
thatp' is less than 1 , higher penalties cause the firm not to produce less

••. •

Critical
Probab1l1ty, p'

F

risky products that the firm would have produced with lower penalties.

E+G

Thus, in Case I, higher penalties encourage the manufacturer to withdraw
less dangerous products from the market.

Case F:

The firm is bankrupt if it continues production and the

product is dangerous: E

<

OH- G.

For larger values of e (e > (E + G)

I H),

production occurs and the product is dangerous. Thus, for larger values of

X

=

Equation 10 is independent of e, indicating that the expected value of
producing the product does not depend upon the stiffness of the tort
The product will be produced if

equation 10 is positive; otherwise, it will not be produced.
20.

THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF STIFFER TO R T PENALTIES

FIGURE1 :

Figure 1 describes the traditional view of the deterrent effect of
increasing tort penalties.21 As tort penalties increase, less risky products are

( l - p)G - pE .

penalties, but only upon p, G, and E.

Severity of Penalties, 9

the firm will be bankrupt if

0 (OH- G >E), equation 7 becomes:
( 10)

H

20

Once agam, the idea is that the most dangerous products, which would have been on

the market were penalties smaller, will not be produced.

21. That the path m Figure I is continuous can be established as follows: The border
between Cases I and F occurs when a • (E +G) I H. The critical probability at the end of Case I
is given by subsmuting that value for a into equation 9, the equation for the Crttlcal probability

in Case I:

,E+ G

p(

G

G

9H

E+

-} =- = --.

-

H

G

Because the critical probability at the end of Case

out Case F (G / (E+G)), the path is continuous.

I

equals the critical probability through·

110

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 99 ( 199 7)

removed from the market. Once the defendant's wealth would be
exhausted if the product were dangerous, then further increasing penalties
has no additional deterrent effect.
C.

The Perverse Effect

This section shows that the perverse effect occurs when the
manufacturer has made prior sales. When there are prior sales, there is a
range over which stiffer tort penalties will encourage the manufacturer to
continue to produce riskier products that it would have withdrawn with
less stiff penalties.
The previous section examined the special case in which there were
0). In this section, I return to the
no prior sales of the product (H0
general case in which H0 is positive. In examining equation 6, the general
equati ?n for the expected gain from continuing to produce a possibly
defective product for a manufacturer with limited liability, there are four
cases to consider depending upon the value of e. These cases are ordered
roughly by increasing values of e.
=

1.

Case I: The firm is never bankrupt: E > eH - G, eH0•
For small values of e, the firm will never be bankrupt. When the firm
can pay the liability in full if the product is dangerous, regardless of its
decision to continue or cease production, the expected gain from con
tinuing production is unchanged by the introduction of limited liability.
Thus, equation 6 reduces to equation 3-the equation without limited
liability.
Setting the net gain in equation 3 equal to 0, and solving for the
critical value of p, yields:
p'(e)

=

G
e(H

H0)

As before, P' is a decreasing function of e. For very low values of e, the
firm will always continue production because probabilities are bounded above
by 1. As e increases beyond this range, stiffer penalties will reduce the
critic�l value of p. Thus, in Case I, the standard view holds: higher penal
. dtscourage production of less risky products.
ties
If e is large enough such that the firm will be forced into bankruptcy if
the product is harmful, the firm's expected gain from continuing pro-
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duction cannot be reduced to equation 3. Obviously, when e is very large,
the firm will be bankrupt if the product is dangerous, regardless of whether
it continues or ceases production. This is Case IV.n However, for inter
mediate values of e. assuming the product is dangerous, the firm will be
bankrupt either if production continues but not if it ceases, or alternatively,
if production ceases but not if it continues. As e increases, the question
whether the firm first becomes bankrupt when it continues or ceases
production distinguishes Case II and Case III.
Case II: The firm is bankrupt if and only if the product is dangerous
and production continues: eH- G > E > eH0•
The second possibility is that if the product is dangerous, the firm can
pay the full award if it ceases production, but not if it continues
production. The assumption that the entire liability award can be paid if
the product is dangerous and production ceases implies that E > eHO . The
assumption that the firm will be bankrupt if the product is dangerous and
production continues implies that E < eH- G. Therefore, the expected
gain from continuing production (equation 6) can be written as:
(13)

Four Cases

(12)
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X

=

C -

D

(1 - p)G - p(E - eH0).

=

For values of e such that the firm is in Case II, the expected gain from
continuing production (equation 13) is a decreasing function of p. Thus,
there is once again a single value of p that represents the highest value for
which production will continue. Setting equation 13 equal to 0 and
solving for the critical value of p, yields:
(14)

p'(e)

=

G
G + E - eHo

Because G and E in equation 14 are independent of e. whereas eHO is
an increasing function of e. p' is an increasing function of e, indicating
that as penalties become stiffer, production will continue for riskier
products. Thus, the perverse effect occurs in Case II: stiffer penalties
encourage manufacturers to keep producing riskier products that they
would have withdrawn from production if penalties were lower. The
intuition behind this result will be discussed after describing the remaining
cases and the different possible paths for p' as a function of e.
Case 111: The firm is bankrupt if and only if the product is dangerous
and production ceases: 8H- G < E < 8H0•
22.

See infra p. liZ.
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The third possibility is that if the product is dangerous, the firm can
pay the full judgment if it ceases production {E > 9H0), but not if it
continues production (9H- G < E). Under these circumstances, the
expected gain &om continuing production {equation 6) can be written as:
X

{15)

=

C - 0

=

G - p{9H - E) .

If the firm is in Case III, equation 15 is positive, even for p l.u The
intuition is that the equity is larger if production continues {whether or not
the product is dangerous) than if it stops. Therefore, if the firm finds itself
in Case III, it will continue production, even if the product is known with
certainty to be dangerous. Thus,24
=

{16)

p'

=

X

{17)

=

C- 0

=

{1 - p)G .

Equation 17 is positive for values of p less than 1. Thus, once
penalties are so stiff that the firm will be bankrupt if the product is
dangerous, regardless of whether it continues or discontinues production,
the firm will always continue, unless it knows with certainty that the
product is dangerous. Thus,
{18)

p'

=

1.

The intuition is that when bankruptcy is inevitable if the product is
dangerous, then the firm's owners risk nothing by continuing production,
but they will receive the gain &om further production if the product is not
23. 11us follows from the assumption that 9H - G < E. Rearrangmg terms, this assump
tion imphes that G > 9H-E, which in tum implies that G- p(9H- E) > 0 for p S I.
24. The equauon for the critical value of p is derived by sening equation 15 equal to zero
and solvmg for p':
p' (0)

G

•

9H

-

dangerous. Therefore, if there is any chance that the product is safe, they
zs
will continue production.
To summarize the above results, the expected gain from continuing
production and the critical value of p for each case are set out in the
following table.
Case

1.

Case IV: The firm is bankrupt if the product is dangerous: E <
9H-G, 9H0_.
The fourth and final possibility is that the firm will be bankrupt if the
product is dangerous. In this case, E is less than both 9H0 and 9H- G.
Under this assumption, the expected gain from continuing production
{equation 6) becomes:

E

This equation is always greater than I for manufacturers in Case III because in Case lll, 9H
< E, which implies that G > 9H- E.
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I

G - p9(H - Ho)

II

(1 - p)G - p(E - 9Ha)

III
IV

2.

Expected Gain from
Continuing Production, X =

G - p(9H

-

(1 - p)G

E)

Critical Probability,
p'=
G
9(H -

Ho)

G
G + E- 9Ha
1
1

The Two Paths

The preceding section derived the expected gain from continuing
production and the maximum value of p for which production will
continue for each of the four cases. That section also described within
each case how the value of 9 affects the critical value of p. To get a
complete understanding of how 9 affects the critical value of p, it is nec
essary to take into account that changing the value of 9 can change the
case. Thus, this section considers how the cases can be combined to
generate paths that distinguish between those products for which pro
duction continues and those for which production ceases as tort penalties
become stiffer.
Case I applies to very low values of 9, and Case IV applies to very high
values. Either Case II or Case III, but not both,26 applies to intermediate
values. Thus, there are two alternative paths for the critical value of p as
25. The above result does not depend on the relative values for L, G, and p; that is, pro·
duction will continue regardless of their values.
26. Both Case II and Case Ill cannot apply to the same flrm for the same nsk because as 9
increases, the flrm will be bankrupt first either if it continues or 1f it ceases production. If the
firm simultaneously becomes bankrupt in both states, which only occurs if (E +G) I H E I H0,
then Case IV immediately follows Case I.
=

-

G
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the value of a increases. The first path will contain Cases I, II, and IV; the
second path will contain Cases I, III, and IV.
If the former applies, then the path for the critical value of p is as
illustrated in Figure 2:

I · · -�

Critical
Probability, p'

!IJ
' E+G
O •
H

maximum deterrent effect when a is set at (E + G) I H, the boundary
between Cases I and II.
If the latter applies, then the path is as illustrated in Figure 3:

IV

IV
9" • £

£
H.

H.

Severity of Penalties, 9

Severity of Penalties, e

FIGURE 3: THE KNIFE-EDGED VERSION OF THE PERVERSE EFFECT

FIGURE2: THE PERVERSE EFFECT

The region above the bold line in Figure 2 represents the products
that are discontinued; below the line are products that continue to be
produced. 27 The dotted line indicates that production will continue over
the indicated range, even if the manufacturer knows with certainty that the
product is dangerous (p 1 ) . The path depicted in Figure 2 first decreases
and then increases as a increases.28 Obviously, the liability regime has the
=

27. Figure 2assumes that all the other parameters, E, G, H, and H., are given, and it illus
trates how changing the severity of the penalty, 9, changes the critical probability, p'.
28. The path as depicted in Figure 2 is continuous because the critical probability at the
end of Case I equals the critical probabtlity at the beginning of Case II, and the critical probabil
ity at the end of Case II equals the critical probability at the beginntng of Case IV.
To establish the ftrst claim, the critical probabtltty at the end of Case I is given by substi·
turing the value of 9 at the end of Case I {{E + G) I H), into the equation for the critical
probability in Case I, equation 12:
p' (�)

H

G

9(H - H.)

G

H �(
H

H.l

Simtlarly, the critical probability at the beginning of Case

II

s
i

given by substitunng 9

(E + G) I H into the equation for the critical probability in Case II, equanon 14:
p' (�)

H

G

G + E

-

9H,

G

G + E

_

1 15

Products Liability and Legal Leverage

.:...(E_+_::G:..:..:)H.�
H

•

G

� (H H

H.)

'
Because the values for p are equal, the path is continuous with an tnflecnon potnt at 9 •
(E + G) I H-the border between Cases I and II.

Once again, the bold line separates products that continue to be
produced from those that are discontinued, and the dotted line, this time
throughout Case Ill as well as in the beginning of Case I, implies that the
manufacturer will continue production in these ranges even if the
probability that the product is harmful equals 1. As in Figure 2, p' is a
decreasing function of a in Case I. However, as a increases beyond Case I,
p' jumps, so that no risky projects will be deterred when the firm is in Case
Ill. As in Figure 2, the maximum deterrent effect is achieved when a is set
at the end of Case I, which now occurs when a E I H0• However, if a is
set slightly larger, the liability regime will not deter any products from
being sold. Thus, there is a knife-edge effect: when a is set near the edge of
=

Case I, a slight increase in the level of tort penalties can eliminate the
entire deterrent effect of the tort system.
Obviously, only one path can apply for a given risk at any time.
Whether Figure 2 or Figure 3 applies depends upon whether, as the value of
a increases, the manufacturer first becomes bankrupt when production
To establish the second claim, the critical probability at the end of Case II is given by substi·
tuting the value of 9 at the end of Case II (E I H.,), into the equation for the critical probabtlity
in Case II, equation 14:

E) _
p' (-

H.

-

G

G + E

-

=

9H,

I .

Because the critical probabtltty throughout Case
border between Cases II and IV.

IV

IS

I , the path is continuous across the
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continues or ceases. That, in tum, depends upon the relative size of the
potential increase in equity to the potential increase in harm from
continuing production. If the potential increase in equity is proportionally
smaller,29 then the manufacturer is bankrupt first if production continues,
and the effect of increasing tort penalties is described by Figure 2.
Conversely, if the potential increase in equity from continuing production
is proportionally larger than the increase in harm,JO then the manufacturer
is bankrupt first if production ceases, and the effect of increasing tort
penalties is described by Figure 3. Thus, if there are high start-up costs,
profit margins are increasing, and the manufacturer has no other profitable
products, then as e increases, bankruptcy will first occur if production
ceases, and so the path will resemble Figure 3. Alternatively, if start-up
costs are low, profit margins are falling, and the manufacturer has other
profitable products, then as e increases, bankruptcy will first occur if
production continues, and so the path will resemble Figure 2.
The paths described in Figure 2 and Figure 3 should be contrasted
with the standard view of the effect of stiffer tort penalties. The standard
view, portrayed in Figure 1, is that the critical probability at first falls and
then levels off once the tortfeasor's wealth is exhausted. However, neither
Figure 2 nor Figure 3 describes a decreasing function that reaches a floor at
which it thereafter remains. In both Figures 2 and 3, the critical prob
ability reaches a minimum. Once the minimum is reached, the critical
probability rises continuously along the first path; with the second path,
once the minimum is reached, the critical probability immediately jumps
to 1. In both figures, it returns to a level at which production will stop
only if p 1 .
As described in Section II.B, the standard view-that increasing the
stiffness of tort penalties has no additional deterrent effect once the point
of bankruptcy is reached-applies only when there are no prior potential
liabilities that can be increased by raising penalties. That is likely to be
true for many kinds of torts, such as accidents, but it is only true for
products liability matters before any sales occur. Once sales have occurred,
the situation is more complex and the results are different. When there are
preexisting sales, stiffer tort penalties will increase deterrence to a point,
but then they will reduce deterrence.
=

29. That is, the rauo ofthe equity if production continues to the initial equity((E +G) I E)
is less than the ratio of the harm from continued producuon to the harm if production ceases
(H I H,).
30. That is, the ratio of the equity from contmuing production to the initial equity
( (E +G) I E) exceeds the rauo of the harm from continuing production to the harm from ceasing
production (H I H0).
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Therefore, the lesson that emerges is one of caution: increasing tort
penalties might cause firms to continue to produce risky products that they
would have withdrawn from the market had penalties been lower.
Although manufacturers would have the proper incentives to make the
efficient decision if the liability system set e 1, and so the full cost of any
harm is internalized, that is true only if e 1 occurs in Case I. If e 1 does
not occur in Case I, then the best that can be done to prevent manu
facturers from inefficiently maintaining dangerous products on the market
is to set e at the end of Case r.>•
=

=

D.

=

The Intuition Behind the Perverse Result

The law-and-economics literature has long recognized the possibility
that, because of limited liability, the deterrent effect of stiffer tort penalties
disappears once the defendant's wealth is exhausted.>2 However, this
Article makes a stronger claim: There is a range over which higher
penalties will encourage manufacturers to continue to produce riskier
products that they would withdraw with lower penalties.>l The intuition
behind that result is driven by an asymmetry created by limited liability.
The entire upside from continuing production-the additional profit if the
product is not dangerous--is enjoyed by the firm's equityholders, but the
3 1 . There is literature devoted to providing reasons why 9 should nor equal I , to which
this Article contributes. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Recoruilkring Eff�eutnt Tort Ruks for Ptrsonal
Injury: The Case of Single Acn11ity Accidtnu, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 4 1 , 81-86 ( 1990) (arguing
that efficiency does nor require the full compensation of damages in single-activity accidents that
impose reciprocal risks). For the purpose of illustration, I ignore the rest of that literature. The
results of that literature, however, could easily be incorporated. If, for reasons other than those
provided in this Article, 9 should have a value other than I , then 9 should be set at the lesser of
that level or towards the end of Case I.
32. See genaaU:t Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2.
33. The Article has rhus far looked at the problem from the perspective of a manufacturer
deciding whether to remove a product from the marker. The Article has not considered the pos
sibtlity of the manufacturer reducing the potential of harm by modifying the product. It is easy
to apply the model to such dectsions. Assume that the manufacturer is deciding whether to
produce a dtfferent version of the product that, at some cost to itself, will produce less harm if
dangerous. In thts case, the decision to continue production described in the model becomes the
dectsion nor to modtfy the product. Similarly, the decision to discontinue production becomes
the decision ro modify the product. With this transformation, G represents the cost of modifying
the product, and E tS the equity after raking into account future sales. Assuming that the manu
facturer would be bankrupt tf it does not modify the product and the product proves to be dan
gerous, bur would nor be bankrupt if it modifies the product, then raising the penalty reduces the
expected cost to the manufacturer if it chooses not ro modify the product. Because raising the
penalty lowers the cost to rhe manufacturer of nor modifying the product, higher penalties will
reduce the like! ihood that the product will be modified.
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downside-the liability award paid if the product is dangerous-is trun
cated by limited liability.H
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This rationale also explains the difference between Figure 1 and

Figure 2.

When there are no prior sales on which the penalty can be

penalties increases the penalty assessed against the manufacturer if the

assessed if the product is dangerous, the additional penalty the manu
facturer pays if it starts production cannot fall as penalties rise. Instead,
once the point of bankruptcy is reached (Case F), there is no additional

if the product is dangerous (Case I), then raising tort penalties increases

deterrent effect from stiffer penalties. Accordingly, in Figure 1, the critical

the difference between the penalty the manufacturer pays if it continues

and then rises.J7

facturer is bankrupt only if it continues production, but not if it ceases pro

behind Figure 2. Once the firm is bankrupt if it ceases production of a

Regardless of whether production continues or ceases, raising tort

product is dangerous. So long as the manufacturer can pay the full penalty

the additional penalty the manufacturer pays if it continues production

production and the penalty if it ceases production. However, if the manu

probability levels off. In contrast, in Figure 2, the critical probability falls

The intuition behind Figure 3 is a more extreme version of that

duction (Case II), then further increasing tort penalties reduces the

dangerous product, but not if it continues production (Case III), then it
can only gain by continuing production. This is because the manufacturer's
equity if it continues production is higher when the product is not dan

if production ceases.JS Thus, limited liability creates the perverse effect by

gerous, and it is at least as high when it is dangerous.38 Accordingly, once

production. This additional penalty falls as penalties rise, until the manu

entirely and production always continues.

this point (Case IV), it pays the same penalty whether it continues or
36
ceases production and so it always continues production.

E.

additional penalty the manufacturer pays if production continues. This is
because raising penalties only increases the penalty the manufacturer pays
reducing the additional penalty that the manufacturer pays if it continues

facturer is bankrupt if it ceases production.

Once the manufacturer is at

34. It iJ worth emphasizing that the perverse effect s
i not eliminated by raiJing penalties
only on firms that are not bankrupt. For example, imposing punitive damages only on solvent
firms would discourage those firms from continuing production that would be solvent if the
product iJ dangerous and if production continues. However, punitive damages would not dis·
courage production by those firms that would be bankrupt if production continues and the
product is dangerous. Indeed, punitive damages would encourage such firms to continue
production if there is any chance that they will be subject to punitive damage in the event that
they cease production. In this case, punitive damages reduce the current net equity of the
corporation, thereby reducing what the equityholders stand to lose from continuing production.
Thus, such punitive damages are more likely to exacerbate rather than eliminate the problem.
Of course, punitive damages would diSCourage risk-taking activity if the manufacturer was still in
Case I after taking the punitive damages into account.
35. The penalty the manufacturer will pay 1f production continues cannot increase
because the manufacturer will be bankrupt if the product is dangerous.
36. An analogy can be drawn between the two paths presented here and the Laffer Curve,
which relates federal tax revenues to tax rates. The endpoints of the Laffer Curve are well
defined: there is no tax revenue 1f the tax rate is either 0% or 100%. (When the tax rate is 100%
there is no activity and therefore no revenue.) As the tax rate increases above 0, revenue ini·
tially increases. At some pomt, however, revenue starts to decline. Efficiency in tax collection
requires that the tax system charge a rate that s
i not above the point at which tax revenue iJ at a
maximum.
Figure 2 represents a sim1lar path for liability awards. When the liability award is very low,
production always continues because the penalty iJ not sufficient to deter the manufacturer from
ceasing production, even if p I . When the liability award iJ very high, the manufacrurer will
be wiped out if the product is dangerous and will therefore conunue production if p < I , because
it has nothing to lose by conunumg. For Intermediate values of 0, the tort system will discourage
•

the firm is in Case III, the deterrent effect of stiffer penalties disappears

Summary
This part has shown that for a manufacturer with preexisting sales,

there is a range within which stiffer tort penalties will lead the manusome projects. As the stiffness of penalties increases, production will be discontinued for lower
values of p. At some point, the deterrent effect iJ at a maximum, and depending on whether
Case II or Case Ill follows Case I, either increasingly risky projects will not be deterred or the
deterrent effect will be immediately eliminated.
37. The perverse effect described in this Article is different than the one described by
Professor Jennifer Arlen, who argues that strict vicarious liability might be counterproductive.
Because the information gathered to monitor managers and deter fraud often ends up being used
against the firm in a civil or criminal action, strict liability discourages monitoring. Professor
Arlen has shown that this effect might outweigh the potential benefit to the firm of the addi·
tiona! fraud deterred. Therefore, this effect might lead firms to do less monitoring. &e Jennifer
Arlen, � Porn�tullly Pm.otne Effects of Corporau Cmnmal Uabtlity, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 833
(199�).

The perverse effect described in th1s Article u also d1fferent from the one descnbed by
Professor Rohan Pitchford. See Rohan Pitchford, How Uab� Should a unda Be! � Case of
]udg�mnr-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1 1 7 1 (1995). Professor
Pitchford shows that increasing a lender's liability for its borrowers' environmental liabilities
might increase the frequency of such accidents. See id. at 1 173. The intuition behind that result
iJ that increasing lender liabihty increases the interest rate on the lender's loan, which reduces
the borrower's equity in the no-accident state. The less attractive the no-accident state is, the
fewer precautions a borrower will take to avoid the rule of an environmental accident and,
therefore, the greater the incidence of such accidents. &e rd. at 1 1 77-78.
38. Assuming the product is dangerous, in Case Ill, the manufacturer's eqUity is higher tf it
continues production; m Case IV, the equity is the same (0) whether production continues
or ceases.
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facturer to continue producing a product that it would have removed from
the market with less stiff penalties.

Recognizing that a range exists in which the perverse effect occurs
says nothing about where it occurs. Where that range begins is crucial to
determining how widespread the perverse effect is. If the perverse effect
occurs only at very high penalty levels, then few, if any, firms will be
affected, and the problem is largely of academic interest. If, however, the
perverse effect can occur at fairly low penalty levels, then potentially many
firms will be affected and the problem is an important one with substantial
real-world consequences. This part focuses on the question of how stiff
penalties must be in order for the perverse effect to occur. The analysis
reveals that the perverse effect is likely to occur at very low penalty levels,
especially when the potential harm is great and when the manufacturer
produces only one product.
This part is divided into three sections. The first section examines
how the outer border of Case I, the point at which the perverse effect
occurs, is affected by changing various parameters. The second section uses
that analysis to show that the perverse effect is likely to occur for many
manufacturers, even if penalties are weak. The third section extends the
analysis to explain why the perverse effect is most closely related to mass
torts.
Comparative Statics

This section examines how changing various parameters changes the
outer boundary of Case I, the point at which the perverse effect appears.
This exercise begins with the boundary conditions. The boundary between
Cases I and II, denoted 8', occurs when 8H - G E.J9 Thus,
=

(19)

e·

=

E

+

G

H

39. This can be seen as follows: Case I occurs when E > 9H - G, 91-1,, and Case II occurs
when 9H- G > E > 9Ho- Thus, the boundary between Cases I and II occurs when 9H - G • E.
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The boundary between Cases I and III, denoted 8", occurs when 8H0

=

THE PREVALENCE OF THE PERVERSE EFFECT

Ill.

A.
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E.40 Thus,

(20)

f)"

=

E

Ho
Consider first the border between Cases I and II (equation 19). That
border is a function of three parameters: E (the current equity), G (the gain
from continuing production), and H (the total harm). Consistent with
intuition, the border is further out the greater E and G are and the smaller
H is.
Recall that Case II begins at the point at which the firm would just be
bankrupt if it continued production and the product were dangerous.
Accordingly, the larger the equity, E, the more severe the level of penalties
must be in order to force the firm into bankruptcy. Similarly, the greater
the gain from continuing production, G, the more money the firm will
have available to pay claims if production continues and the product is
dangerous. Consequently, the greater the gain from continued sales, the
more severe the penalty level must be in order to force the firm into
bankruptcy. On the other hand, the greater the potential total harm from
continued production, H, the less severe the level of penalties must be to
push the firm into bankruptcy.
A similar analysis can be conducted for the border between Cases I
and III (equation 20). The border between Cases I and III is extended by
increasing E and contracted by increasing H0 (the harm if production
ceases). This is also consistent with intuition. Case III begins at the
penalty level at which the firm would just be bankrupt if it stopped pro
duction and the product were dangerous. The larger the equity, the stiffer
penalties must be to drive the manufacturer into bankruptcy. In addition,
the greater the level of harm caused, the less stiff penalties need be in order
to force the manufacturer into bankruptcy.
B.

The Prevalence of the Perverse Effect

This Article has described how stiff tort penalties can cause firms to
keep products on the market that they would have withdrawn if penalties
40. This can be seen as follows: Case I occurs when E > 9H - G, OH.,. and Case lll occurs
when OH0 > E > OH - G. Thus, the boundary between Cases I and lll occurs when 91-1, � E.
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were lower. Although this perverse effect is possible, not all firms are at

the point at which this effect occurs. Some firms are in the region in
which stiffer penalties will have the usual effect of discouraging production
of less risky products. Accordingly, the most important issue this Article

1 23
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is 0.096.

4> Increasing tort penalties from 65% to 300% of any harm caused

will encourage the manufacturer to produce the product regardless of the

probability that the product is dangerous.

Thus, while the manufacturer

would have removed the product had that probability been greater than

0.096 and the penalty had been 65% of any harm, when the penalty is

raises is the prevalence of the perverse effect.
Although the answer to such a question is ultimately empirical, the

three times the harm, the manufacturer will not withdraw the product if

effect occurs when the manufacturer would first become bankrupt, which

have a significant impact and has the potential to affect many firms. It is

perverse effect is probably widespread because it can occur at very low
penalty levels that are substantially below full compensation. The perverse
would occur no later than when e

=

(E + G) I H. Thus, when the potential

there is any chance it is not dangerous.
Thus, it is clear from this simple example that the perverse effect can

also clear that the problem is more likely to occur the less diversified that a

harm exceeds the manufacturer's equity, including the profit from further
sales, the perverse effect will occur below full compensation.

manufacturer's product line is.

profitable products, because the additional equity must be exhausted before

C.

The perverse effect is, however, deferred if the manufacturer has other

bankruptcy occurs.

Returning to the example in Part I (in which the

equity is $12 million, the gain from additional sales is $1 million, the
potential harm from prior sales is $4 million, and the potential harm from

0.65.41
If the equity were only $6 million, the perverse effect would occur when e
- 0.35.42 For the perverse enect
a
not to set in unti I compensation is
complete (9 1), the equity must be $19 million.
additional sales is $16 million), the perverse effect begins when e

=

=

Moreover, not only can the perverse effect occur at a low penalty
level, it can also have a large effect on the critical probability. The tort

system has the greatest deterrent effect when the manufacturer is at the

end of Case l. Once penalties are raised high enough, so that the manu

facturer is in Case IV, the entire deterrent effect disappears.

Returning

again to the example from Part I, tort penalties have their maximum

deterrent effect when e

=

41. Th., J)"rve= effect begins in Case
19 yields:

e·
42.

•

�
16 + 4

Q

=

zo

In this case, the critical probability

0.65.

=

II.

0.65 .

The substitution yields:

9

=

6 + 1
16

+

4

1
zo

Substituting the parameter values into equation

In addition, the perverse effect is more

likely to occur the greater the potential harm.
Application to Mass Torts

As described in Section liLA, the greater the harm caused if the
product is dangerous, the lower the penalty level at which the perverse

effect occurs. As described below, the potential harm is greatest when the
risk of injury is highly correlated across users. This suggests that the
perverse effect is most likely to occur with mass torts

With many goods, there is little uncertainty about the aggregate level

of injuries that will occur. A common example from torts casebooks is soda
bottles that either blow up or contain animal parts.

number of such occurrences and the magnitude of the resulting injuries.

Today, the same thing can be said for tobacco, silicone breast implants, and
asbestos, except that the numbers are much higher.

There was a time,

however, when such connections were less clear. At that time, the differ
ence between soda bottles and asbestos existed in the variance of possible
43. The critical probability at the end of Case
into �uauon 12. Thus,
p'

E + 0
( -H )
-

•

(E +

OH
O)(H

-

H.)

Substituting for the parameters yields 0.096:
035.

Based on past expe

rience, a large company can predict with reasonable confidence both the

p(0.65)

=

l ZO
.

( 1 2 + I)(ZO

=
-

4)

0.096 .

I

is given by substituting 9

•

(E

+

0) I H
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injuries. If asbestos were not harmful, there would be no or very few inju
ries. Conversely, if it were harmful, the number of people affected would be
staggering. Thus, there was a lot of aggregate product risk from asbestos
because of the high correlation of risk across users. On the other hand,
soda bottles produced much less aggregate uncertainty from the manu
facturer's standpoint. Only a few bottles would be defective, and the total
number of defects could be predicted with considerable accuracy, even if
the defective bottles could not be identified in advance. As a result, the
bottles had low volatility, whereas asbestos had high volatility.
When there is little aggregate risk, because the manufacturer is fairly
sure of having to make some payments, E is smaller. However, H is also
smaller because it is unlikely that the manufacturer will have to make
many large payments. On the other hand, when there is high aggregate
product risk, both E and H are higher. For risks with equal expected
liability judgments, the manufacturer is generally more likely to produce a
product for which the risks are highly correlated. Thus, the perverse effect
is more likely to occur with products whose risk is highly correlated than
with products whose risk is weakly correlated.�
The level of tort penalties at which the perverse effect occurs is also
affected by technological and economic developments. With soda bottles,
the manufacturer will quickly learn the rate of failures. However, with
asbestos, it might take many years to learn whether the product is harm
ful.45 The longer it takes to determine whether the product is dangerous,
the more sales will occur before the issue is resolved.46 More sales implies
44. Assume that the aggregate risk from a weakly correlated risk is smaller than H ( H - X)
and that there will be injuries of at least p'X. The border between Cases I and II with a weakly
correlated risk, the point at which the perverse effect begins, 08 ·, s
i given by:

a:

=

E - pX + G
H - X

Comparing e· to 9a. and rearranging the terms yields:
9' _::
<

9,'

as

pH

_::
<

E + G .

Thus, if the firm's expected cqu1ty from continuing production when
the risk s
i perfectly corre·
lated (E + G) IS
than the expected harm (pH), the perverse effect begins at a lower
penalty
level when the nsk IS perfectly correlated; otherwise, it begins at a
lower level when the risk 15
weakly correlated.
45. Su Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Untkmandmg
Mass Perrona! Injury
Linganon: A Soc•o·l..tgal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1016 (1993).
46. Goods can be divided into inspection goods, experience goods,
and credence goods,
based on how easy it is to asce tain their qualities at low cost. The
quality of inspection goods
�
. d by observauo
can be determme
n before purchase (for example, the ripeness of fresh fruit); the

�ess
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greater profits from additional sales, G; but, it also implies a larger potential
liability if the product is dangerous, H. Thus, the longer it takes to resolve
the uncertainty, the stronger the incentive to contmue producuon.47
0

0

Economic developments might also have reduced the level at which
the perverse effect occurs. Larger and more competitive markets have the
tendency to increase sales proportionally more than profits. This suggests
that G has probably declined relative to H, which would cause the perverse

effect to occur at lower levels of 0.48

The implication is that there is reason to believe that economic and
technological developments have increased the number of firms subject to
the perverse effect. Thus, it is possible that today there are more products
on the market that would be withdrawn if penalties were not as stiff than
there were in the past.
D.

Summary

This part has revealed what features characterize those firms that are
most likely to be subject to the perverse effect. The perverse effect is most
likely to occur when equity and profitability are low and the potential
harm is high. The latter is most likely to take place when risks are corre
lated, which occurs most obviously with mass torts. In addition, this part
has shown that many firms might be subject to the perverse effect, which
can occur at low penalty levels.
IV.

NEGLIGENCE

Part II showed that under a strict liability regime, stiffer tort penalties
will, over some range, encourage firms to continue to produce risky prod
ucts that they would withdraw from the market if penalties were less stiff.
This part extends that result to a negligence regime. This discussion is
quality of expenence goods requires use (for example, the relative amounts of fruit and syrup in
canned fruit}; and the quality of credence goods might not be revealed even after substanual usc
(for example, the health consequences of pesticides used on fruit). See M1chael R. Darby & Ed1
Kami, Free Compenrion and w Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 j.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 ( 1 973).
Compared with 100 years ago, there are many more expenence and credence goods today. Su

WIUIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POsNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 2848 5 (198 7). The growth in credence goods is responsible for the increased time it often takes to

determine whether a product is dangerous.
4 7. Increasing both G and H by the same proportion, k, contracts the border between
Cases I and II. That is, (E + G) I H > (E + Gk) I Hk, for E > 0 and k > I.
48. lncreasmg H more than G contracts the border between Cases I and II. That is,
(E + G) I H > (E + Gk) I Hk', for k > I and k' > k.
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more complicated than the discussion of strict liability because there is an
added level of uncertainty with negligence. When enforcement is imper
fect, there is, in addition to uncertainty about whether the product is dan
gerous, uncertainty about whether the defendant will be found negligent
and will be held liable.
The first section illustrates that when the negligence regime is per
fectly enforced, so that there are no mistakes in assessing liability, the
perverse effect does not occur. The second section then shows that the
perverse effect does occur when enforcement is imperfect, such that a party
might be held negligent when it is not negligent or might not be held
negligent when it is. The third section then compares strict liability and
negligence in terms of the stiffness of the tort penalties required to produce
the perverse effect and shows that the perverse effect will require higher
penalties in a negligence regime.
A.

Perfect Enforcement

Negligence differs from strict liability in that the manufacturer is
liable for injuries caused by its product only if the manufacturer has been
negligent in some way. As applied to the decision whether to continue
producing a product that might be dangerous, the manufacturer is liable
only for injuries resulting from negligent sales. Assume, for example, that
the manufacturer has not been negligent in selling the product so far, but it
would be negligent if it continued to sell the product. Consequently, if the
manufacturer ceases production, it will not be liable for any injuries that
might be caused by its product.
The negligence rule can be made operational by assuming that there is
a minimum probability of the product being dangerous, P below which
continuing to sell is not negligent but above which it is. Thus, the
negligence rule creates three possibilities: ( 1 ) the earlier, lower probability
and the current, higher probability are both below the negligence thresh
old; (2) both probabilities are above the negligence threshold; and (3) the
probabilities straddle the threshold.
The first possibility, in which both probabilities are below the negli
gence threshold, is easy to examine: because the manufacturer faces no
liability by continuing production, production will continue. The second
possibility, in which both probabilities are above the negligence threshold,
.. .
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is similar to the strict liability regime considered in Part ll:49 further sales
might occur, despite the higher probability of injury, because a portion of
the liability is externalized.
The most interesting and important possibility is the third one, in
which the probability increase crosses the negligence threshold. This
possibility is the most significant because it is at this point that the law
aims to stop production. Although there are circumstances in which the
manufacturer will proceed, negligence law has a lot of stopping power.
That power comes because liability will be assessed only if the manu·
facturer continues to sell past the negligence threshold. Accordingly, when
the manufacturer crosses the threshold probability, stiffer penalties will not
encourage manufacturers to continue production. If the manufacturer will
not be bankrupt if a judgment is assessed against it, stiffer penalties will
discourage continuing production. If it will be bankrupt, stiffer penalties
will neither encourage nor discourage manufacturers from continuing.
Thus, with a perfectly enforced negligence standard, unlike with strict
liabiliry, raising the liability award will not encourage firms to continue to
produce at higher probabilities than otherwise and consequently does not
generally have the perverse effect described in Part II. It does have such an
effect, however, when the negligence standard is imperfectly enforced.

B.

Imperfect Enforcement

Slightly more than ten years ago, John Calfee and Richard Craswell
showed that when the negligence standard is imperfectly enforced, many of
the conclusions about the consequences of adopting a negligence rule must
be revised.50 In the same way, the above analysis of the effect of higher
liability awards on the extemalization of product risks must be revised to
account for an imperfectly enforced negligence standard. The most plau
sible way of modelling uncertainty surrounding the negligence standard is
to assume that the conditional probability of being held liable (assuming
the product is dangerous) is an increasing function of the probability
49. The analysiS is similar, but not equivalent, to the analysis for strict liabll1ry, because
umt was
the manufacturer is not liable for the harm from all saler-unless selling even the firsr
negligent.
.
.
mce wlfh
u
50. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, SOfll( Effects of Uncertamcy on Compl

l..tgal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974-84 ( 1984).
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that the product is dangerous when the decision to continue was made. If
the probability that the manufacturer is held liable, assuming that the
product is dangerous, is denoted as q(p; p..), with q'>O, then 1 - q is the
probability that the manufacturer will not be held liable.
To simplify the model and parallel the strict liability discussion,
assume there is no possibility that the manufacturer will be held liable if
the product is not dangerous. Accordingly, the manufacturer will pay a
judgment only if: (1) the product is dangerous, which has probability p; and
(2) the manufacturer is adjudged negligent, which has conditional prob
ability q. Thus, the probability that the manufacturer will be held liable is
pq. In calculating the manufacturer's expected gain from continuing
production, there are two values of q that must be taken into account. The
conditional probability of being held liable if production ceases is flo• and
the conditional probability if production continues is q.. with q1 > <Jo·
Accordingly, the firm's expected equity from continuing production can be
written as:

(21)

C

E + G - pq1min(E + G, SH) .

=

Similarly, the expected equity from ceasing production is given by:

(22)

D

=

E - pq.,min(E, 8H0)

•

Thus, the expected net gain from continuing production (the
difference between equations 21 and 22) is given by:

(23)

X=C

-

D

=

(1 - Mo)G - p[q.min(E, SH - G)

- CJomin(E, e�))
1.

.

Four Cases

As with strict liability, there are four cases to consider depending upon
the value of e. For each case, the expected gain from continuing
production and the critical value of p are set out in the following table.
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Case

I

II

Ill

IV

Expected Gain from
Continuing Production, X

( 1 - Mo + pqi )G
-

p8(q1 H - <IoH0)
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Critical Probability,

t>' =

=

G
(<Jo

-

q)G + e(qH

- <Iol-\)

( 1 - Mo)G

G

- p(q,E - qoeHo)

� G + q E - q eHo
0
I

( 1 - pq0 + pq1)G

G

- pq18H + pq0 E
(1 -

-

pqo)G

p(ql - qo)E

(q0 - q)G

+

q18H - q0E

G
qp + q1 E - Clo E

Case I: The manufacturer is never bankrupt.
In this case, the critical probability falls as e increases, just as it did
51
with strict liability.
The intuition is similar to what it was with strict
liability: increasing the value of e increases the expected penalty by a larger
amount if production continues than if production ceases.
Case II: The manufacturer is bankrupt when the product is dangerous
and it is held liable, but only if production continues and not if production
ceases.
In this case, the critical probability rises as the value of e increases,
52
just as it did with strict liability.
This is the perverse effect, whereby
stiffer penalties encourage the production of riskier products. Under the
assumption that the negligence standard is imperfectly enforced, the
51. In Case I, the critical probability in a negligence reg1me is a decreasing function of
9, because 9 enters positively into the denominator.
.
.
52. In Case II, the critical probability in a negligence reg•me is an mcreasmg funcuon of
9, because 9 enters negatively into the denominator.

1 30

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 99 ( 1 997)

intuition for the perverse effect in Case II is similar to what it was with
strict liability: increasing the stiffness of tort penalties reduces the manu
facturer's expected equity if production ceases but has no effect if pro
duction continues. Thus, increasing tort penalties, by reducing the amount
the manufacturer risks by continuing production, encourages continued
production of potentially dangerous products.
Case III: The manufacturer is bankrupt when the product is dangerous
and it is held liable, but only if production ceases and not if production
continues.
Unlike Cases I or II, the effect of increasing tort penalties in Case III
is very different with negligence than with strict liability. In a strict
liability regime, a manufacturer in Case III will always continue pro
duction. In contrast, in a negligence regime, increasing tort penalties
reduces the critical probability throughout Case Ill. The intuition behind
the latter effect is that the conditional probability of being held liable
(assuming the product is dangerous) is greater if production continues, q, ,
than if it ceases, q0• Thus, unlike a strict liability regime, in which there is
no cost to the manufacturer from continuing production in Case III,
because the manufacturer is bankrupt if production ceases and the product
is dangerous, there is such a cost in a negligence regime. The cost of
continuing production in a negligence regime is that the manufacturer is
more likely to be held liable if it continues production than if it ceases
production. Moreover, the assumption that the manufacturer can pay the
liability if it continues production but not if it ceases production implies
that the penalty paid if production is continued increases as penalties
stiffen. Thus, the critical probability is a decreasing function of e, and
there is no perverse effect.
Case IV: The manufacturer is bankrupt if it is held liable, regardless of
whether it continues or ceases production.
The effect of increasing the value of e on the critical probability in
Case IV is also different with negligence than with strict liability. In a
strict liability regime, a manufacturer will continue production unless the
product is certain to be dangerous. In a negligence regime, the critical
probability in Case IV is fixed and independent of e. That probability
might be greater than l , in which case production will always continue, or
it might be a fixed value between 0 and l . Once again, the intuition is that
the cost to the manufacturer of continuing production is the larger condi
tional probability of being held liable (assuming the product is dangerous)
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if production continues than if production ceases. 53 Thus, in Case IV, the
manufacturer balances the higher probability of bankruptcy if production
continues and it is held liable, against the higher equity if production
continues and it is not held liable. Because the manufacturer's equity in
every possible state is independent of e, the critical probability is also
independent of e.

2.

The Two Paths

As with strict liability, there are two possible paths for the critical
probability. As the value of e increases, the path will consist of either
Cases I , II, and IV; or Cases I, Ill, and IV. When the path contains Case
H
Ill, the path is similar to the traditional view of increasing tort penalties,
as illustrated by Figure 4:
I
Cnru:al
Probaboloty, p'

••••

Ill

IV

Severity of Penalties, 9

FIGURE 4: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF STIFFER TORT PENALTIES
WITH NEGLIGENCE

Figure 4 shows that the critical probability decreases continuously
throughout Cases I and Ill. At the end of Case III, it reaches a floor at
which it remains throughout Case IV. Thus, when the path contains Case
Ill, there is no perverse effect. This is very different from the path with
strict liability, which exhibited a knife-edged perverse effect at the
beginning of Case I l l.
53.
54.

That is, q, > q.,.
Su supra p. 109.
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In contrast, when the path contains Case II, the path exhibits the
perverse effect as it did with strict liability, as illustrated by Figure 5:
I

••..

result from the tortfeasor's negligent conduct, a modified negligence rule
that assesses liability on earlier, nonnegligent sales if the tortfeasor is later
negligent. The difference in the harm from nonnegligent sales for which
the tortfeasor is liable with these two versions of the negligence rule, HN, is
assumed to be a constant that is independent of whether production is
Because both H and

II

IV

E+G
H

&verityofPenalties, 9
FIGURE 5: THE PERVERSE EFFECf WITH NEGLIGENCE
When the path contains Case II, the critical probability is a

decreasing function of a throughout Case I until the minimum critical
probability is reached at the end of that case. Once that point is reached,

the critical probability is an increasing function of a throughout Case II.

At that point, the critical probability reaches a plateau, at which it remains
throughout Case IV. In Case IV, increasing tort penalties has no additional

deterrent effect, although tort penalties have some deterrent effect. Thus,
with negligence, as with strict liability, the critical probability is a U

increasingly dangerous products that they would have withdrawn from the
market were penalties less stiff.
Comparing Liability Regimes

penalty only on negligent sales.

occur with strict liability.

When the path contains Case II, the outer

HN/5

a negligence rule that

57

The boundaries are the same with strict liability and with a negligence
rule that looks back to the first sale.58 The boundaries are extended if the
negligence rule does not look back to the first sale. Moreover, the more
55. Because H... the nonnegligent sales, are a constant, the difference between H and H0 is
the same with both the standard negligence rule and the look-back rule.
56. This can be seen as follows: Denote the boundary between Cases I and II by 9', with
either a subscript "N" or "L" to denote the negligence rule either without or with a look back to
the first sale. Thus, the boundaries are given by:
E + G
e ' : -•

H

and
9' '

a

E ____:
+ :.._
G
-=.._
H

-

H.

Because H.. is positive, 9L' is greater than e.. Thus, the boundary between Cases I and II i.!
further out with a negligence rule that does not look back to the first sale.
57. This can be �en as follows: Denote the boundary between � II and IV by 9", with
enher a subscnpt "N" or "L". (I use the notation 9" becau� the boundary between Cases II and
IV. when the path contains Cases I, II, and IV. is the same as the boundary between � I and
I II, when the path contains Cases I, Ill, and IV. Thus, the boundaries are given by:
•.

9,
•

liability but not with negligence. This is one way in which the perverse
There is also a second way in which the perverse effect is more likely to

are reduced by

out than a negligence rule that looks back to the first sale.56 Similarly, the
far border for Case II is also extended by a negligence rule that assesses a

When the path contains Case III, the perverse effect occurs with strict
effect is more likely to occur with strict liability than with negligence.

H0

does not assess liability on any nonnegligent sales extends Case I further

Once again, therefore, this time in a negligence

regime, stiffer penalties might encourage firms to continue to produce

C.
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continued or discontinued.

Critical
Probability,p'

shaped function of a.
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=

E

-

H.

and
E

border of Case I occurs at a lower level of a with strict liability than with
negligence. The rest of this section compares the border between Cases I
and II with strict liability and negligence.
In order to make this comparison, it is useful to consider, in addition
to the standard negligence rule that imposes liability only on injuries that

Because H,. is positive, 9." is greater than 9,.". Thus, the boundary between Cases II and IV
is further out with a neglagence rule that does not look back to the first sale.
58. This follows from notes 56 and 57, which �t the boundaries between the regions.
When H,.· 0, 9',. = e·L and 9",.- 9"L·
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59

sales that escape liability, the further out are the boundaries.

Thus, with a
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wealth is tied up in the firm.
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They might also be more committed to

negligence rule that assesses liability only on negligent sales, there are
values of e for which the firm would be in Case I, whereas with strict liabil

maintaining production because they will be unemployed if production
stops.62 The first effect would tend to encourage firms to cease producing

ity or a negligence rule that looks back to the first sale, it would be in Case

risky products, whereas the second would have the opposite effect. A more
thorough understanding of the perverse effect would require taking into

II. Thus, for a given level of e, the perverse effect is more widespread when
liability is assessed only on negligent sales.60

Thus, it seems likely that

because of the tendency over the past thirty-five years for courts to replace
negligence with strict liability in products liability matters, the perverse

account the ability of equityholders to control their agents--the managers
who make these decisions.6J However, scholarly work on the introduction
of agency theory into tort law is only at the earliest stages.64

effect is more widespread today than it was a generation ago.61

A related complication that has been ignored thus far is the possibility
of equityholders withdrawing capital from the firm. Such withdrawals are

D.

attractive to the equityholders because they will generally not have to
repay these amounts to the corporation's creditors if the product is dan
gerous and the corporation becomes insolvent. The possibility of such

Summary
Part IV has shown that the perverse effect also exists in a negligence

regime with imperfect enforcement.

Unlike with strict liability, the

perverse effect exists only if the path contains Case II. Moreover, the
knife-edged perverse effect, which existed with strict liability, does not
exist with negligence.

This part has also shown that the perverse effect

will occur at the same level of e with both strict liability and a negligence
rule that looks back to the first sale.

However, the perverse effect will

require a higher level of e when liability is assessed only on negligent sales.

V.

ration will increase the value to the equityholders of ceasing production
because the owners will receive more. Such a possibility will also increase
the value of continuing, because if the product is dangerous, the

equityholders will still receive something.

If the entire equity could be
stripped out of the corporation before the victims obtained a judgment,

production would continue indefinitely. Of course, in this case, stiffening

tort penalties would have no effect on the decision whether to continue

AVENUES FOR FuRTHER RESEARCH

There are several ways to modify the analysis in this Article.

withdrawals has an ambiguous effect on the decision whether or not to
continue production. The possibility of withdrawing funds from the corpo

production, because no liability awards would ever be paid. If everything
For

example, throughout this Article I have looked at just one actor, the owner
of the firm. Most firms, however, are run by managers, whose interests do
not always coincide with those of the equityholders. Management is often

could be stripped out of the firm only if it ceased production, because of the
need for working capital or otherwise, then this possibility would encourage
ceasing production.

If, however, the equityholders could strip money out

from the firm only by continuing production, perhaps because ceasing

thought to be more risk averse than equityholders because more of their

production would lead courts to impose a constructive trust and wait for a

59. TillS also follows from supra notes 56 and 57. The larger H,. is, the larger are e·.
and 9"•·
60. The results are ambiguous as to whether strict liability or a negligence rule that looks
back to the first sale has a h1gher critical value of p when in Case II. This is because the
expected values of the equity if production ceases and if production contmues are both higher
with negligence than with strict liability. Accordingly, because the decision whether to continue
production is made by comparing the expected value of the equity under the two circumstances,
neither rule necessarily has a higher or lower critical probab1ltty than the other.
61. Stt 1 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELYIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02 ( 1997)
(descnbmg the history of products liab1ltry law); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 46, at 284-86
(identifying strict liab1ltty supplanting negligence as one of the two most important develop·
ments in the history of products ltab1ltty law and dating that development as beginning roughly
around 1960).

encourage continuing production.

resolution of the claims, the possibility of withdrawing funds would
Moreover, under these last circum

stances, higher penalties will encourage continuation.

In any event, a

62. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Sn-ategic Reaction w Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. I, 10-17
( 1986) (arguing that managers are likely to maintain production in the face of mass tort risks for
a variety of reasons, including job security).
63. Managers also have their reputations, which are tied to the success of their firms. It is
unclear in which direction this cuts: managers might discourage production to avoid association
with the harmful product; conversely, managers might encourage production because of the
higher profits in the short run and possibly over the long run.
64. Among the few such examples are the articles by Professors Arlen and Roe. Stt Arlen,
supra note 3 7; Roe, supra note 62.
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more complete model would consider the possibility of withdrawing funds
5
from the corporation and, in the extreme, liquidating the corporation.6

A related issue, not previously discussed, is the effectiveness of other
mechanisms in eliminating the perverse effect by restraining the manu

facturer's ability to externalize risk.

Such mechanisms can be divided

between private and public.
One private mechanism that might prevent manufacturers from
selling many potentially dangerous products is the decision by retailers as
to what products to carry. Under long-standing products liability doctrine,
the retailer is jointly and severally liable with the manufacturer for any
harm caused by a product it sells. Thus, for retail goods, it is not sufficient
for the manufacturer to produce the goods; retailers must also sell them.
Hence, the perverse effect will not occur when stiffer penalties cause so

many retailers to drop out of the market that the manufacturer can no
longer sell enough products for it to be worthwhile to continue production.
Another private mechanism that might restrain manufacturers from
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that they a s stockholders, as well as employees, might want to pursue. That
mechanism, however, is probably not very effective when the probability

that the product is injurious is low because, under those circumstances,
almost any decision can be defended as reasonable.

However, when the

probability that the product is dangerous is very high, sanctions are much
more likely, and so these mechanisms might be effective.

Thus, the

efficacy of these and perhaps other mechanisms in restraining the perverse
effect warrants additional attention.68
Assuming that the perverse effect is widespread, the question arises as

to what, if anything, should be done about it. One possibility is to reduce
penalties.

If tort penalties are excessive, this Article has provided an
additional reason for reducing them-increasing penalties might actually
encourage manufacturers to maintain riskier products on the market,

whereas reducing penalties might have the opposite effect. Moreover, this
Article suggests that one cannot infer from an observation that there are

producing many potentially dangerous products is the intervention of out

many dangerous products on the market that tort penalties are too low,
because stiff penalties might be responsible for the most dangerous

to produce a potentially dangerous product as a good gamble, the firm's

For firms in Case I, in which stiffer penalties have the usual deterrent effect

side investors. Although equityholders might see the decision to continue
debtholders, who have a smaller potential gain and a larger potential loss,
might regard the decision otherwise. The strong incentive equityholders

have to externalize risk under certain circumstances is well recognized,

both in the academic literature and in practice.66 To restrain equityholders
from transferring risk to debtholders, capital structures are designed and
bond covenants are often inserted into trust indentures.67

Of course,

assuming such covenants are effective, there is a point at which the gamble
looks good to the debtholders and so they would not seek to prevent it.
More generally, the presence of other investors in the firm only changes
the point at which the perverse effect occurs, not irs existence.
There are also public mechanisms to restrain manufacturers from

products.

Obviously, reducing penalties might create its own problems.

of causing manufacturers

to

withdraw less risky products, reducing tort

penalties will encourage manufacturers to maintain less safe products on
the market. Moreover, reducing penalties is likely to encourage firms to
introduce less safe products.

A second possible response is to establish minimum corporate equity

requirements.

Although the United States has no such general require

ments, balance sheet regulation is common in several industries, especially

financial services.69

Although requiring greater equity would reduce the

perverse effect, such a requirement would impose large costs on manu
facturers, which would be passed along to consumers. Capital is expensive
to hire, and doing so on the off chance that it would later be required to

Managers who impose outrageous risks on the public

pay a judgment would impose large and otherwise avoidable costs.70 Thus,

face the possibility of personal liability and criminal sanctions. In theory,

before concluding that there should be minimum corporate equity require-

externalizing risk.

at least, these sanctions can prevent managers from pursuing risky projects
Professor Mark Roe argues that a liquidation is an unlikely response to a mass torr. See
Roe, supra note 62, at 59 (considering strategic responses to mass torrs and concludong that the
complete avoidance of liabolity IS "untested, unproven, and seems unlikely to be uniformly
successful").
66. See e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theary of w Finn: Managerial
Be/oa.,or, Agency Costs and Ownership Srrw:ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334--3 7 ( 1976).
67. Examples of such covenants onclude requiring bondholder approval of certain deci·
sions or requiring the firm to purchase insurance or to maintain certain financial ratios.
65.

68. There are also social pressures and moral obhgauons that might affect the decision
whether to continue production.
69. See generally Joseph Jude Norton, Caporal Adequacy Standards: A l.egitJmate Regularory
Concern for Pl'lUkntial Supervuion of Banking Accil!ltifi?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299 ( 1989) (describing
the history of bank capiral regulation in the United States).
70. In addouon, some commentators believe that equity is an especially costly form of
capital because debt is much more effective at disciplining managers. See Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Cort=ate Finance , and Takovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324-25 ( 1 986).
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ments, it would be worthwhile to consider eliminating the ex1stmg tax
incentives that encourage corporations to increase debt and reduce equity.
The largest of these is the preferential tax treatment of debt relative to
11

•

equity.
Another possible response is to require corporations to obtain liability
insurance. Requiring manufacturers to carry complete liability insurance
would not only protect tort creditors, it would also internalize the full cost
of the harm.
assuming 9
=

Thus, returning once again to the example from Part I,
million if the manufacturer

1, full insurance would cost $1.6
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Alternatively, if strict liability is the

appropriate standard, then the need to find another response to the per
verse effect remains as strong as ever.
Still another possible response to the perverse effect is to improve the
position of tort creditors in bankruptcy by paying their claims before the
claims of unsecured creditors.74

Although improving the priority of tort

creditors would increase their likely recoveries in bankruptcy, it would not
eliminate the perverse effect. This is because equityholders and voluntary
unsecured creditors together would still have an incentive to externalize

continued production. Because that amount would exceed the gain from

risk to tort creditors. Once the point is reached at which the unsecured
investors' investments in the tortfeasor corporation would be wiped out,

perverse effect could be eliminated by requiring full insurance. In practice,
however, there are problems with requiring full insurance, because insur

neither the equityholders nor the unsecured voluntary creditors have a
strong incentive to prevent the continued production of a potentially dan·
gerous product. Thus, improving the position of tort creditors in bank

additional sales by $600,000, the manufacturer would cease production if it
12
Thus, at least in theory, the
were required to purchase full insurance.

ance creates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Most notably,
it dampens the incentives for other parties to take precautions that could
reduce the probability or magnitude of the harm.
A fourth possible response is to reverse the trend from negligence to

strict liability in products liability matters. Replacing strict liability with

negligence would ameliorate the perverse effect of stiffer penalties by
extending the region in which stiffer penalties have their usual effect.
However, the debate as to whether strict liability or negligence is the
appropriate standard in products liability matters involves many issues in
73
Thus, if negli
addition to the perverse effect, and as yet is unresolved.
gence is the appropriate standard for reasons unrelated to the perverse
effect, then the amelioration of that effect is a further advantage of
7 1 . �e jANE G. GRAvaLE, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, CORPORATE TAX
INTEGRATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS I I ( 1 991) (esumating that the total tax rate on debt is
about halfof that on equity).

72.

There is a 10% chance that the widgets are dangerous. If they are dangerous and pro·

duction continues, the new sales will cause $16 million of harm. Thus, the expected harm, the
product of the probability that widgets are dangerous (0.1) and the harm if they are dangerous

($16 million), is $1.6 million. Thus, an insurance company would require the manufacturer to
pay $1.6 million to provide $16 mtllion m coverage if the widgets are dangerous. Because the
manufacturer would only make a $1 million profit by continuing production, it would lose
$600,000 if it continued production and purchased the msurance policy.

73. Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Posiriw Economic Analysis of
Products LiabtiJty, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 ( 1985) (arguing that the replacement of negligence
with strict liability in products liability matters enhances efficiency), with George L. Priest, The
lnwnrion of Enterpnse Uability: A CntJCal Hl.!tury of the lntellwual Foundaaons of Modem Tort
lAw, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 ( 1 985) (arguing that negligence ts more efftctent than strict liabtltty
in products liability matters). �e also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOM·
ICS 438-39 (1988) (summarizing the above debate).

the risk of loss is borne by tort creditors.

Under these circumstances,

ruptcy does not eliminate the perverse effect, it only changes the point at
which it occurs.
A sixth possible solution is to rely more heavily on regulations.

In

principle, the entire ability of manufacturers to externalize risk to consum
ers because of limited liability can be eliminated by direct regulation:
regulators can remove those products that are "too risky" and that manu
facturers are unwilling to withdraw from the market.

In actuality, regu

lation is likely to be of only limited efficacy. This is because the regulator
must have a lot of knowledge to regulate effectively, which is unlikely to be
true, and because the regulator must be able to make an independent
decision free of political influences, which is open to question.

Thus,

although the possibility of manufacturers externalizing risk to consumers
might justify some regulations, it is unlikely that regulation can eliminate
that possibility.
A seventh possible response is to eliminate limited corporate liability
75
and the discharge of debts in bankruptcy. Although academics have made
76
proposals along both these lines, none of these proposals has met with
74.

�e Leebron,

suflra note 15, at 1643-46 (proposmg that tort creditors be gtven pnonty

over both secured and unsecured creditors in bankruptcy).
75. Such reforms would internalize the enure downside risk, thereby eliminating the trun·
cated downside that equityholders see of risky projects.

76. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorgani�anons, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 ( 1 986) (corporate bankruptcy); Douglas G. Batrd, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50
J.L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 ( 1987) (personal bankruptcy); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlnruted Shareholder Ltab<Lty for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991)
(proposing to hold shareholders proportionately liable for claims that exceed corporate assets).
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77
much support, and modifying limited liability would also impose costs.
Thus, if the problem described in this Article is widespread, as it appears to
be, there will be a need to craft a response, either from the list above or
elsewhere, that eliminates or at least reduces the problem, without
imposing too many other costs.

CONCLUSION
The economic approach to tort law is based on the premise that
78
individuals respond to incentives. The most basic result in that literature
79
is that stiffer penalties discourage less risky activities. Previous commen
tators have shown that larger penalties have no additional deterrent effect
once a tortfeasor's wealth is exhausted.l!O This Article has shown that for
the important example of products liability cases, the deterrent effect of
stiffer penalties does not merely disappear, but is actually reversed once a
tortfeasor's wealth is exhausted. Stiffer penalties then encourage tortfeasors
to keep riskier products on the market that they would have withdrawn
with less stiff penalties. The explanation for this perverse result is that the
manufacturers' decision whether to continue production depends on a
comparison of its expected equity from continuing and ceasing production.
Initially, raising penalties reduces the expected value of the equity from
both continuing and discontinuing production. But, once penalties have
been raised to the level at which the manufacturer would be bankrupt if
the product is dangerous and production continues, further raising pen
alties only reduces the expected value of the equity from discontinuing
production. Thus, in products liability matters, the usual logic-that
higher awards and tougher rules (strict liability over negligence) will dis
courage the production of risky products-is at some point reversed.
Moreover, the perverse effect is likely to be widespread, even at low penalty
levels, especially for firms that do not have a diversified product line and
whose products have the potential to cause great harm. It is therefore
possible that reducing tort penalties in products liability cases will
77. &t FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 49-52 (1991) (de.«:ribing the costs of unhmited liability).
78. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 73, at I I (stating that "the rules created by law
establish implicit prices for different kinds of behavior, and the consequences of those rules can
be analyzed as the response to those implicit prices") (emphasis omitted); LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 46, at 9-14 (defending the assumption).
79. This is a simple application of the law of demand-raise the price and less will be
purchased.
80. &t generall-y Polmsky & Shavell, supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2.
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encourage manufacturers to withdraw their riskiest products from the
market. If that is true, the concerns of proponents and opponents of
products liability reform, encouraging the introduction of new products and
removing dangerous products from the market, can both be met by
reducing the stiffness of tort penalties.

